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Abstract. Tuscan notarial acts permit the exploration of the often elusive relation-
ship of Jewish practice, Jewish law and the corresponding laws of the state. One issue
in early modern Italian Jewish marriage negotiations was the eventual disposition of
the dowry of a childless wife who predeceased her husband. Jewish law on the succes-
sion of the childless woman was complicated by traditional or regional customs and
communal ordinances. Moreover, in sixteenth-century Tuscany there was no official
code, court or arbiter of Jewish law. Nonetheless, Christian notaries who wrote pre-
nuptial stipulations or pacts for Jews worked with the assumption that Jews were
allowed to live according to their own law. This essay argues that individual Jews
used to advantage the state’s assumption that they could follow Jewish law (despite
the absence of any universally-acknowledged or applicable law on this specific sub-
ject) by employing notaries to write contracts in disregard of both local statutes and
well-known Jewish customs. In the second part of this essay I locate the stipulations
in the Jewish marriage system and suggest that the process of negotiation over the
fate of the dowry was integrally related to the system’s emphasis – in contrast to
that of contemporary Christians – on universal marriage and procreation.
“If the Bride should chance to die, after the Marriage, without hav-
ing brought forth any Children, the Dowrie which she brought, her
husband must in this case be disposed of, according to the Agree-
ments before made betwixt both Parties: which are very different,
according as the Customes, and Usages, of the several Countries
are.”1
In the Tuscan city of Prato in June 1570, members of two Jewish
families contemplated the possible future death of a woman married
so recently that the transfer of her dowry had not yet been recorded.
Indeed, it was the transfer of the hundred and thirty scudi of Perla’s
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dowry from her father Salamone di Ioab of Castronovo to her newly wed
husband Dattero, son of Prospero di Angelo of Candia, that prompted
the notarial act that provides our window onto the scene. The notary
who drew up the document called the confessio dotis, which certified
that the dowry had been paid, at the same time added a pact with
various stipulations.2 Among these was the specification that if the
bride, Perla, should chance to die childless, her husband Dattero would
return to her father Salamone or his heirs half the dowry that she had
brought into the marriage.
In Jewish and Christian practice alike, marriage arrangements were
governed both by written legal traditions and by unwritten and some-
times flexible customs. The complicated interplay of written law, cus-
tom and familial strategies may be teased out of the notarial documents
in which Jews, like Christians, expressed to each other their financial
obligations and, to interested governing officials, their conformity with
the law. This essay focuses on the notarial stipulation concerning the
division of the dowry on the death of the childless daughter as a point of
entry into a larger discussion about the relationship of some sixteenth-
century Jews to Jewish law and to ethnicity, on the one hand, and,
on the other hand, about the relationship between these Jews and the
early modern Florentine state.
The first part of this essay analyzes the marital pact and its provi-
sions in the context of the history of common law and Jewish law on
the subject. This review of legal history is necessary to establish that
such notarial pacts, though they make no explicit reference to Jewish
law, depend on the understanding that Jews were entitled to live in
accordance with the laws of their religion. This assumption, with its
own presumption of the existence of a coherent and known body of
Jewish law – or its lack of interest in the content and procedures of
Jewish law – is integrally related to the specific way that the Christian
world, and in particular the Medici state, saw the Jews as “other”. The
second part of this essay places the dowry stipulation in the context of
the Jewish marriage system in which it played a role, drawing atten-
tion to some of the differences between that system and the Christian
marriage pattern. 3
The division of the dowry: Legal status and customary
practices of the Jews
It is in the nature of the notarial art to standardize language, but to
do so as though recording agreements spontaneously spoken during a
dramatic meeting of actors. The scene in Prato presented above is that
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of a business transaction common to Jewish and Christian marriages
in sixteenth-century Tuscany. It is likely that the bride’s father and his
new son-in-law had written a betrothal document earlier and that the
transaction before us – the “confession” of the dowry payment – took
place shortly before or after the religious ceremony called “nissuin,”
the wedding.4 That ceremony most probably also included the prepa-
ration of a Hebrew marriage contract (ketubbah) and culminated in the
symbolic procession of the bride to her husband under the huppah (the
canopy which represented the house of the husband) and then of the
bride to her husband’s actual house (the “leading” – ductio).5
The sums involved, the notarial language, and the constellation of
persons said to be present at the signing were all typical for a Tuscan
marriage negotiation in the sixteenth century. Samuel Cohn Jr.
has recently demonstrated that “even the most impoverished of rural
[Christian] Florentine families sought out the official sanctions of no-
taries and paid their fees to formalize their marital ties in writing.”6
Tuscan Jews also participated in this culture, validating their marriages
with specifically Jewish rituals and within this notary-facilitated and
document-based culture.
There were also more specific reasons to hire a notary. The notary’s
formal legal language promised the validity and enforceability of the
provisions. Then too, the notarial document registered the compliance
of these Jews with local law: after Dattero acknowledged his receipt of
the dowry from Perla’s father, he in turn gave her fifty lire as dona-
tionem, the counter-gift, “in accordance with the statutes of Prato.”7
Yet for all the similarity and conformity of these Jews in Tuscany to
standard practices, there were ways that this scene was specifically
Jewish. The groom, who gave his age as eighteen, was far younger and
presumably closer in age to his bride than Christian men in Tuscany
usually were when they married.8 A second difference, upon which this
essay will focus, was the dotal pact (patto) that the two families in Prato
added to their record of the 1570 receipt of dowry. This pact stipulated
that in the event that Perla should predecease her husband Dattero
without leaving him children (sine liberis), the widowed Dattero must
return half the dowry to his father-in-law, Salamone, or to Salamone’s
heirs.9 Perla might face the dangers of pregnancy and childbirth, but
this premarital stipulation meant that her parents would not risk “both
the daughter and the money” when they turned over the girl and the
130 scudi to Dattero.10 The assumption behind the language of this
stipulation would seem to be that without it, the husband would not
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have had to return, but would rather have kept the dowry of his wife
upon her death.
This pact and its stipulation were not part of the standard notarial
procedure and were not attached to Christian confessions of the dowry
at this time. The disposal of the dowry in the event that the wife died
childless was not a question that was ordinarily negotiated by Christian
families in the sixteenth century: the issue had been decided and was
the subject of municipal statutes in many Italian cities, as we shall see.
The fact that the laws on this issue varied regionally was not irrelevant
to the families of Perla and Dattero. It was probably not yet clear
to them where the newlywed couple would settle. For political and
economic reasons, relocation was a regular feature of Italian Jewish life
in the sixteenth century, if not of every individual’s experience. The city
states, duchies and republics of the politically-fragmented peninsula in
the sixteenth century alternately and in fits and starts expelled their
small Jewish populations or threatened to do so, invited Jewish bankers
or merchants to settle and privileged them, created restrictive ghettos,
or tolerated Jewish refugee immigration.11 Some Jews were pushed out
or invited in; others just migrated. The condotta, or charter, was still
the basis for much of Jewish settlement, so young Jewish members of
the banking elite and a larger set of agents, servants and other economic
dependents might move to a new location for economic opportunity.
Jewish men traveled and moved in order to study, and Jewish women
and men as well might relocate in order to marry. It is presumably in
light of this high mobility that the notary added, after the main provi-
sions of the pact, that the terms of the pact were to be considered valid
in Prato, Florence, Rome, Siena, Pisa, Bologna, Modigliana, Ferrara
and other places.12
The specification that the contract should be valid in these various
cities deserves some consideration since Florence, Ferrara and Rome
(to consider just three of these places) were the seats, in 1570, of three
distinct political states, each with its own legal system and complicated
relationship to the Jews who resided there. For whose eyes, then, was
the pact – notarized by an official, licensed notary – written? By whom
was it to be considered binding and valid in all these places? To what
kind of court or officials or informal authorities did the notary address
his instruction? And, because it is not so obvious as it seems, by what
authority did this notary write a pact for two Jews that conflicted
explicitly with local laws and customs?
Our first effort to understand the stipulations in the pact made
between Dattero and Perla’s father should be made in the context of
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the law of succession which operated in the Florentine dominion, the
”Maritus lucretur dotem uxoris sue premortue.” The complex history
of this law has been studied by Julius Kirshner; the relevant pieces of
that story are presented here briefly.
Roman law, operative in medieval Florence, had granted the wom-
an’s family of origin the return of her dowry when she predeceased
her husband.13 It also allowed the use of dotal pacts to individualize
many aspects of the agreement.14 The Roman law was modified in
many Italian cities in the thirteenth century by statutes which gave the
husband the right to retain from one-third to all of the dowry if there
were no surviving children. In territories closest to Florence, Kirshner
found that in Pisa, Siena, Arezzo and Pistoia a widower was granted
half of the dowry of a wife who predeceased him with no surviving
children.15 In Florence, where such statutes were not instituted in the
fourteenth century, individual Christians began to include stipulations
to the documents that recorded the receipt of dowry. These stipulations
overturned Roman law completely, granting the whole dowry to the
husband if the wife predeceased him.16 Justinianic law was eventually
fully reversed officially in Florence and in her possessions by a statute in
the mid-fourteenth century which granted the husband full possession
of his wife’s dowry and property upon her death if she had no surviving
children.17 In reversing Roman law, Kirshner argues, the city formalized
what had already become a customary practice in order to encourage
men to contract marriages and to see them through from betrothal. Low
marriage rates and birth rates were of concern after the demographic
devastation of the Black Death. By removing the bride’s father’s claim
to the dowry, the modified law addressed the concern of marriageable
but hesitant men that they might be required to return the dowry soon
after expensive marriage festivities should the wife become ill and die
before or as a result of pregnancy or childbirth. On the other hand, the
failure of some men to consummate a marriage after betrothal was of
great concern to the families of many betrothed women. The statute
therefore also intended to satisfy them, in an effort to protect the honor
and reputations of the women and their families, and therefore abbrevi-
ated the period between betrothal and marriage by making a husband’s
claim on the dowry contingent upon his having actually brought his wife
to his home – “ductio.” This law was reaffirmed in 1355 and 1415, and
was, according to Kirshner, still in effect in the sixteenth century in
Florence and its now much larger territory.18
In other locations in the sixteenth century there was what amounted
to more of a compromise with Roman law. In Siena in 1545, for example,
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before its capitulation to Medici control, the last statutes of the inde-
pendent republic confirmed the thirteenth-century rule that returned
one-half of the dowry to the family and left one half with the widowed
husband.19 The same division of property also was found in the mid-
and late-sixteenth century statutes of Rovereto, a Venetian city.20 Amid
this regional and local diversity, Dattero, located in Prato, agreed to
keep only half the dowry and to return half to his wife’s father if she
died childless.
As the notarial acted noted with reference to the size of the counter-
gift, this confessio-dotis was written at least partly in conformity with
the statutes of Prato.21 But on the issue of succession of the wife,
Prato was without special statutes and was subject to the laws of
Florence. Florentine law specified that if a woman predeceased her
husband without leaving children, the entire dowry remained with the
husband.22 This stipulation specified in Dattero’s pact is not found
in notarial marriage documents drawn up for Christians by the same
notary, nor does it seem to be commonly known to scholars who have
studied sixteenth-century Christian marriages in this region.23 In sum,
Dattero’s pact did not conform to local statutory law. It is reasonable
to proceed, then, by testing the possibility that the stipulation in this
dotal pact was written in response to or in conformity with Jewish legal
tradition or custom.
It is important to recall that the dotal pact under discussion was
written with the expectation of broad validity, in a geographical and
political sense. People who employed notaries to draw up contracts or
compacts certainly believed that these legal documents were effective
and enforceable. As we have seen, in this case the clients and the
notaries aspired to write a civil contract that would be considered
valid even if the person in possession of the document moved to a new
political territory. The stipulation of pan-geographic applicability was
not standard in notarial documents pertaining to marriage in Tuscany.
This suggests one of two possibilities. The first is that Jews, but not
Christians, were taking advantage of a general legal right (available also
to Christians) to render civil contracts at will, even in contravention
of local statutory law. This does not seem to have been the case in
the sixteenth century. In theory, under Roman law, pacts undertaken
freely by two parties had legal status. But, as Walter Ullman noted,
the Roman emperor Constantine had ruled that customary law could
not override statutory law, for “if customary law had been credited
with derogating powers, all doors would have been opened up to the
gradual elimination of all statute law.”24 In the matter of the return of
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the dowry, pacts and stipulations were common practice (representing
“customary law”) in the fourteenth and fifteenth century. But once
statutory law was written on the subject, the pacts and stipulations
ceased as a normal notarial practice. (This seems to have been true even
though, as Thomas Kuehn has warned, once a given case was being con-
tested, statutes were not actually interpreted without reference to ius
comune and did not always override it.25) Notaries apparently did not
draft documents for Christians that freely contradicted local statutory
law or that claimed to have pan-geographic applicability. In particular,
Christian notaries in sixteenth-century Tuscany did not write pacts for
Christians that determined the assignation of the dowry in the event
that the daughter should die childless.26
Since it was not standard practice, it is not likely that the notary
prompted the Jews to write the pact. Rather, the impetus to write it
must have come from the Jews themselves, and the notary’s willingness
to oblige is explained by his knowledge that they were Jews. As such,
they assumed – and their notary assumed with them – a right to be
governed by a law that was independent of locale.27
The inclusion of a statement of broad geographic applicability was
not standard for notarial acts in Tuscany, but Hebrew formularies for
business contracts, written by Italian Jews, did sometimes include this
type of language. An example of this may be seen in a mid-sixteenth
century formulary-book, in a document that was used to show that
a debt had been satisfied.28 Here the scribe explicitly described his
intention to write a document that would be considered valid and usable
for judgment “in every court [before which] it is brought, whether by
the laws of Israel or by the laws of the Nations of the World,29 whether
in the courts of Perugia, Arezzo, Cortona, Florence, Foligno, Spoleto,
Camerino, Rome, Toscana, Le Marche, the Duchy, Patrimonio, or in all
the rest of the established courts . . . ”30 It is hard to imagine that any
court would dispute a duly-witnessed document stating simply that
a debt had been satisfied, but the concern of this Hebrew formulary
note was to ensure exactly this, that it would be considered valid
(once translated) in any court. It is that much easier to imagine that a
personal contract concerning the division of the dowry upon the death
of the daughter could be contested in court.
It is not certain whether a sixteenth-century Florentine notary op-
erated on the understanding that Jews were allowed to follow another
law under the principle of “personal law” (ius proprium),31 or perhaps
under the principle of “the law of the nations” (ius gentium), a concept
refined by the fourteenth century jurist and law professor Baldus de
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Ubaldis.32 Jews had the complex status of Roman citizens, of members
of the civic body where they lived, and of a people permitted to observe
their own religious rites, as a notary would have easily seen in the
De Iudaeis, a major codification of Jewry law published by the jurist
Marquardus de Susannis in Venice in 1558 and reprinted in 1568.33
Consequently, as De Susannis had argued, Jews were subject to canon
law, Roman law, and local statutory law, and were entitled to observe
Jewish law when it impinged on none of these.34 But the specific issue
of the division of the dowry was not discussed by De Susannis, which
leaves open the question of Jewish law on this matter and whether it
impinged on any other law.
On a practical level, it seems that the notary who wrote the stipula-
tion for the Jews based his act on the most basic principle (within ius
commune and confirmed in canon law) that Jews, as cives romani, are
permitted to observe their religion without undue interference.35 Yet
the distinction between the religious rites and customs of the Jews –
protected for many centuries by papal policy – and their other “laws”
was not clearly defined. Papal edicts often referred only to the pro-
tection of Jews’ right to observe their “customs” and ceremonies, but
sometimes referred explicitly to the right of Jews to live according to
their “laws.”36
The implication of all this for notarial practice, it seems, was that
Jews were considered entitled to live according to something probably
thought of by administrators and officials of the Tuscan state (such
as notaries) simply as “their law.” This, at least, is exactly how it
is referred to in charters granted to Jewish bankers in Tuscany at
this time. Privileges granted by Cosimo I de’ Medici to these families
included the provision that the Jews who held the privileges should not
suffer any impediment to the observance of their Sabbath, festivals or
“their laws”.37
What might “their law” have meant to Jews in Tuscany and the
notaries they employed? On the one hand, if “their law” is understood
to mean simply “Jewish law,” it is arguable that Jewish law would in
this particular case say that the dowry should be disposed of according
to (local Jewish) custom or usage. This was the opinion of Italian and
Polish rabbis of the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, and it was
made known widely even in vernacular languages by Leone Modena,
whose History of the Rites and Customs of the Jews is quoted at the
beginning of this essay.38 In the absence of “custom” one could learn
from the Jewish law codes in print by the mid-sixteenth century that
rabbinic law permitted a husband to stipulate against his right to in-
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herit his wife, and that in the absence of such a stipulation the husband
inherits the dowry of his wife.39
At this point we have established only that our notarial document
does not conform to statutory laws in Tuscany: it does not specify that
its stipulations are written in accordance with “Jewish law.” Indeed, we
would not expect to find such an explicit claim in a notarial document
in Tuscany, for there could be no consensus on what that would mean.
Some Jews of Tuscany – and Christian jurists – may have had access to
copies of the relevant volumes of Maimonides’ law code, the Mishneh
torah, to Jacob ben Asher’s law code, the late medieval Arba’ah turim,
or even possibly to the code of Joseph Karo, the Shulhan ‘arukh, printed
in Venice in 1564–1565.40 But Jews had no “official” law code, and
Medici state authorities did not choose one for them. The state did not
appoint for the Jews of Tuscany a court that would base its rulings
on Jewish law, nor was there an appointed or acknowledged rabbi or
rabbinical board for the Jews of Tuscany as a whole in the mid- or
late-sixteenth century.41 For specific families of Jewish bankers who
had privileges, there was written affirmation of their right to observe
their holidays and laws. Other Jews residing in Tuscany, Jews who
had no special privileges and were not “covered” by the privileges of
the bankers nonetheless appear to have made silent reference to this
presumed right when they wrote pacts such as the one before us.
The opacity of the pact and the ineffability of “their law” is, I am
arguing, key to the power of the text to capture the Jews’ right to
observe “Jewish law.” The notary does not refer directly to the Jewish
law on this matter or to Jewish custom; the Jews in this marital nego-
tiation are rendering allegiance to a more abstract law – and not only a
specific legal practice – a detail of which is ultimately being articulated
and thus made in the very process of its notarization.
As Robert Bonfil has described the situation, Jewish communal lead-
ers in most Italian territories up until this time attempted to persuade
their coreligionists to settle civil suits by arbitration rather than in
formal courts of law.42 Jews were in some places formally privileged to
avoid local state court systems, but a formal, permanent Jewish court
system was established in only a few places. There was, in 1570, no
officially sanctioned rabbinic court in any of the cities mentioned by our
notary in the special clause that detailed the validity of the pact outside
of Prato.43 The absence of a permanent court system meant that in
some places where there were active rabbis they competed with each
other for influence and litigants convened competing “courts” during
a dispute or turned initially or in appeal to non-Jewish courts. Thus,
82 STEFANIE B. SIEGMUND
in Rome Jews might resolve a conflict over a dowry or inheritance in
front of an assembly of rabbis and community officials.44 In Bologna
a Jew might have to choose allegiance from among several rabbis who
held court.45 But in all of these places a Jew might also turn to a non-
Jewish court, as was done frequently in Florence and most of her subject
Tuscan towns in the sixteenth century. In the Medici state, Jews were
subject specifically to the Florentine court of the Otto di Guardia e
Balià, a court comprised of eight Christian laymen, citizens of Florence
who served in four-month rotations.46 Little is yet known about the
practical resolution in Tuscany of ordinary cases that involved Jewish
arbitration, which left no formal record, or of cases tried and settled
in court. Even less is understood about what may have happened in
cases where disputants forced a confrontation between “Jewish law”
and common law.47
The authority of rabbis to adjudicate and the existence of Jewish
courts are, of course, separate from the question of the content of
rabbinic law on our subject and its influence. Rabbinic law existed
as written text (available for study) and in some cases was part of the
common knowledge and practice of the Jewish population. Indeed, the
fate of the dowry in the event that a woman died childless had long
been of interest to Jews as well as to Christians.
As noted above, the basic rabbinic law of succession was that a man
inherited his wife’s possessions – including her dowry – if she had no
male children at the time of her death. Meanwhile, Florentine statutes
had reversed Roman law, which returned the dowry and possessions to
her father’s house. Thus, local Florentine statutory law and rabbinic
law agreed that the widower inherits the dowry. It might therefore seem
that Tuscan Jews, when they wrote the stipulations in their premarital
contracts, intended to avoid the standard of local law, of rabbinic law,
or of the laws of both legal systems.48
But the above-stated rabbinic law was hardly the end of the matter.
As in the Roman legal system, there was the possibility of customary
law in the absence of specific statutory law and there was the possibility
of statutory law. That is, there was precedent for the modification of
marriage contracts by stipulation and there was an extant body of the
equivalent of statutory law, known in the Jewish context as takkanot
– ordinances – decided upon by local or regional gatherings of rabbis
and/or magnates.49
The legal device of adding stipulations to an engagement or marriage
contract had probably emerged as soon as the Jewish marriage contract
itself began to be standardized. Stipulations that alter the law of suc-
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cession are first seen in use among Jews of Syria and Palestine under
Roman rule, and the practice was accepted as valid by rabbis cited in
the Palestinian Talmud.50 The customary restriction of the husband’s
right of succession subsequently appeared with many variations and
modifications in Jewish marriage practice wherever Jewish diaspora
communities took root, and especially wherever the Palestinian tradi-
tion – or Roman law – had influence.51 The variants differed mainly
on what part of the dowry should be returned to the father’s house, on
what types of property this included,52 and on whether the return of
the dowry applied only if the bride died childless within the first year
of marriage, or even if she died more than one year later.
In some Jewish communities, as we shall see, these pre-nuptial stip-
ulations and others pertaining to marriage and divorce became stan-
dardized as takkanot.53 Where they had been adopted by communal
ordinance, stipulations were often no longer written into the marriage
contract.54 This is exactly the process that had occurred in Chris-
tian Tuscany, but in reverse. Standardizing a customary usage, Floren-
tine statutes had moved away from Roman law, allowing the widower
to keep the dowry; various Jewish communal ordinances had moved
toward Roman law, forcing the widower to return part of the dowry.
The important version of the ruling that was adopted among French
and German Jews in the thirteenth century returned to the parents or
the donors of the dowry either all or half the dowry of a bride who died
childless in the first year of her marriage, and half the dowry if she
died during the second year. This Ashkenazic custom and its variants
(generally referred to as one of the takkanot of Shu”m – the acronym for
Speyer, Worms and Mainz – or of Rabbenu Tam) were followed by Jews
in Poland and Lithuania into the early modern period and were widely
known in rabbinic literature.55 Another important tradition, codified
in the sixteenth-century Shulhan ‘arukh but based on the fourteenth
century takkanot of Toledo, ordained that if the wife predeceased her
husband without children, her family took back a third or one half of
her dowry regardless of how many years the marriage had lasted.56
The Jews of central and northern Italy were a population whose
ancestors came from Sicily and southern Italy, from German and French
lands, from Spain and Portugal, from the Ottoman Empire and from
regions of North Africa. As the Italian Jewish population grew and
communities developed during the late middle ages, leaders gathered
and decreed several sets of ordinances in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries, but none concerned the specific subject of the succession of
wives who died childless.57 These councils were infrequent and tended
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to deal with pressing concerns, so we need not be surprised that the
issue was not legislated.
In this silence it might be imagined that Italian Jews lived according
to the customs of their lands of origin. Some contemporary rabbis
described their world in these terms. For example, Rabbi Azriel Diena
(d. 1536) referred clearly to the custom of “French and Ashkenazic”
Jews that the whole dowry is returned to the father’s house if his
daughter died childless within a year of the marriage.58 For Diena, this
custom was relevant to a case involving Italian Jews of French or Ashke-
nazic loyalty in which his opinion was sought. About a century later the
Venetian rabbi Leone Modena wrote in his vernacular, polemical auto-
ethnography of the Jews that on this issue Jews rule according to the
“Customes, and Usages, of the several Countries,” as one early English
translation had it, or according to the “pacts that are customary in
[that] country, which are diverse.”59 Here Modena casually commented
that the difference was regional, whereas in the introduction to his
work he had explained that the customs of the Jews varied according
to three, less geographically-specific, national groups: Levantine, Dutch
(German), and Italian.60 It is not clear in the case of our inheritance
question whether Modena had in mind an “Italian” custom, or referred
to other national customs that might be used by Italian Jews who
were bound by them. In any event, it is noteworthy that despite their
presumably divergent motivations, two Italian rabbis whose life-times
frame the period we are discussing both refer to inheritance traditions
that invoke attachment to locale or loyalty to place of origin.
But it is not at all clear that all Jews in the Italian states had either
a new “Italian” tradition or knew of or chose to adhere closely to the
specific customs that written tradition associated with their lands of
origin. We shall see that in fact, the Jews of Tuscany cannot easily be
divided into Jews who followed the “Ashkenazic” tradition and those
who followed the “Toledan” or Spanish tradition. Moreover, that there
was no distinctive “Italian tradition” is clear: no one particular custom
was in use – or had yet been established – in Tuscany in the second half
of the sixteenth century. To exemplify this, we shall compare the terms
of the pact written by Dattero and Salamone in 1570 with those used
in marriage documents drawn up for a couple exactly three years later,
after the Jews of Prato and the other towns in the Florentine dominion
had been expelled from their towns and had resettled in Florence.
In October 1573 in the new Florentine ghetto, Iudit, the daughter
of Ioseph Ursi, was to be married to Gratiadio di Ventura Leucci. Ursi,
sometimes known as a German Jew, was from Perugia, and the Leucci, a
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long-established Italian Jewish family of perfume-merchants, were from
Pisa.61 This was a high status marriage in Tuscany, probably the most
costly Jewish marriage arranged in Florence since the establishment of
the ghetto there in 1571.62 The dowry was five hundred florins, a small
sum for a member of the Florentine patrician elite or nobility at court,
but a respectable dowry for members of most of the guilds, and more
than most other Jewish families in the ghetto could afford. According
to the betrothal agreement, Iudit’s father Ursi would have one year to
turn over the dowry in gold to Gratiadio Leucci, and after its transfer
the young man was to give Iudit a ring, and gifts, and conduct her to
his house “in Florence or elsewhere.”63
The notarized contract included a number of stipulations, the first
of which dealt with the possibility of the bride’s death. If, deus avertat
(God forbid)64 Iudit should die without sons or daughters, the dowry
– all of it, not just half – was to be returned to her father Ioseph, if he
were still alive, within a year of her death.65 Despite the similarity to
the pact in Prato, Dattero and Gratiadio committed themselves to their
fathers-in-law differently. The former referred to the possibility that his
wife would die without children [sine liberis]; the latter specified sons
or daughters. The one promised to return half the dowry; the other the
whole. One would return it to the father-in-law or his heirs; the other
only to the father-in-law, but promptly, within a year of his wife’s
death.
Though Florentine law granted that the widower kept all the dowry
if his wife predeceased him, we have now seen two Jewish contracts
written in Tuscany only three years apart, one which would have the
widower return half the dowry to her family, and one which would
have the widower return the whole to the family. These Jews were not
observing Florentine law, but what law were they following? Given the
diversity of the origins of these Tuscan Jews and more generally of Jews
of the northern and central Italian states and the extent of Jewish mo-
bility and intermarriage, what was “Jewish custom” in Tuscany, when
Jews marrying did not always obviously belong to the same (or to any)
clearly defined Jewish ethnic group? Did they divide themselves into
clear categories: Italian Jews of French and German origin following
the Ashkenazi tradition (takkanot Shu”m/ Rabbenu Tam) and Italian
Jews of Spanish, Portuguese and Levantine origin following takkanot
Toledo?66
It could be surmised that Perla and Dattero’s stipulation conforms
to the rule of Toledo (one-third or one half back to her family, regard-
less of how many years after the marriage her death). Though neither
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family used a Spanish eponym or epithet, the groom’s family came from
Venetian Crete, which did have a Spanish refugee population as well as
a long-established Jewish population. But it could as readily be thought
that they had adopted the stipulation from the custom of Siena where
the rule was to divide the dowry evenly, perhaps under the guidance of
the Da Pisa family who had lived there for some time, to whose house
the notary had come for the signing of the papers, and who may have
been the young couple’s patrons.67 Meanwhile, the stipulation written
by German-Perugian Jew Ursi and his Pisan son-in-law Leucci (that
her father gets back all of it within a year of her death) conforms neither
to Toledo, nor to the standard formulations of the Ashkenazi takkanah,
nor to Florentine statutory or the earlier Pisan statute, and certainly
not to the Talmud, but rather hearkens directly back to Roman law.
If these families intended to invoke a specific Jewish tradition, perhaps
it was a creative adaptation of Rabbenu Tam’s tradition. Instead of
agreeing that the father gets back all if the daughter dies within a year
of her marriage, the tradition is revised in favor of Ursi, who demands
to receive back her whole dowry within a year of her death, even if she
dies after one year of marriage.
Although there were subdivisions within Italian Jewish communities
in some Italian cities, especially for the purpose of political represen-
tation or public worship, it would be difficult to support the claim
that all early modern Italian Jews clearly identified with or expressed
any attachment to a place of origin (i.e. had “ethnic identity”) or to
specific religious-legal traditions associated in rabbinic literature with
that place. Where the overall numbers of Jews were small, marriage
ties that united families who were likely to have come from places that
observed different traditions further weakened any such allegiances. In
our two Tuscan marriages we encounter couples living in Prato and
Florence whose fathers came most recently from Crete, Castronovo in
the dominion of Ferrara, Pisa and Perugia.68
Even if we imagine that what we are seeing here is adherence to,
or an effort to follow, specific Jewish traditions (that of Toledo in the
first case, or that of an Italian version of the Ashkenazi custom in
the second), the final product, the stipulation, was not determined
by any identifiable reference to ethnicity, neither was it justified by
allusion to that Jewish custom nor by reference to law. Rather, the
stipulations resulted from a process of negotiation in the course of which
words and options were sifted and selected from a large set of available
customs. The uniqueness of each document reflects but does not reveal
this process as Jews creatively negotiated the main sets of traditions
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and influences to which they were exposed: rabbinic law, Jewish custom
(itself complex and regional), and the influence of the laws and practices
of the Christians among whom they lived.69
The state’s unarticulated assumption of the existence, and observ-
ability, of Jewish law served as a useful fiction for the Jews of Tuscany.
There was a vast and still-growing body of Jewish law and commentary,
and there were many rabbis who engaged in the interpretation of Jewish
law and ordinary Jews who were concerned to live in accord with it.
However, on the specific issue of the return of the dowry, “Jewish law”
was not so clearly established that the Jews of Tuscany could have
“known” it, or how it applied specifically to them. These Jews worked
with the legal framework, colluding with their own representation as
“other” and enjoying the flexibility that status afforded them as indi-
viduals at a time and in a place where there was no official interpreter
or arbiter of Jewish law, and no one authorized to police its application.
In other words, the state allowed Jews to observe their own laws and
this allowed them a great deal of freedom as individuals, at least in the
case before us and perhaps in other cases when there was no authority
actively involved in the enforcement of a particular interpretation of
Jewish law.
Because of the way Jews used Christian notaries in Tuscany, it has
proven futile to undertake a comprehensive analysis of Jewish marriage
contracts in this period. But a similarly complex picture arises from the
much more extensive data available from the Roman archives, where
Jews consistently used a few notaries – Jewish notaries. These docu-
ments reveal that during a formative period from the 1530s to the 1550s
no universal rule of succession was being followed.70 There was some
variety, though it was certainly limited, in the details of the stipulations
concerning the property of a woman who predeceased her husband.
The Jewish notarial documents in Rome that contain stipulations
state most often that if a wife predeceases her husband within the first
year of marriage and leaves no living children, one-third or one-half of
the dowry is to be returned. These contracts are close to the Ashkenazic
custom or its close variants. But even here there are modifications to
the very feature that characterizes this custom – the restriction that
the property is returned only if her death occurred during the first year
of marriage. (This restriction is not mentioned in the Tuscan pacts.)
Sometimes in the Roman contracts it is stipulated that the dowry
or part of it is returned even if the wife dies after the first year: in
the second year, in the first four years, within ten years or without a
year limitation.71 In one case, the contract stipulates that if she dies,
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the husband retains the entire dowry.72 Sometimes the dowry is to be
returned or partially returned even if the marriage produced children
who survived. The heterogeneity of details here is evidence that at least
some small number of these Jews in sixteenth century Rome, like the
Jews in Tuscany, were not routinely following the takkanah of Rabbenu
Tam, Takkanot Toledo, or any other definitive custom.73
In Rome the rabbis who served as the ghetto’s notaries were in
time able to amalgamate the various traditions formulaically and help
bond the community in the process.74 Within decades, under the skilled
hand of the rabbi-notaries in the Roman ghetto, a new Roman-Jewish
tradition was created. Stow explains that the notarial development of
legal forms, language, and new customs such as this one regarding the
division of the dowry were an important part of the process by which
the ethnic groups in Rome were successfully forged into a more united
community. The evidence from later marriage contracts of Livorno,
Venice and Ancona suggests that by the seventeenth century it was not
only in Rome that a high level of standardization had been adopted.75
The Roman example presents a situation in which at first, distinct
customs which were known by their place of origin were practiced by
Jews of corresponding origin. Further analysis of Tuscan notarial doc-
uments pertaining to Jewish marriages may eventually reveal whether
distinct religious traditions and customs also coexisted in Tuscany until
a new Italian or Florentine tradition was created by some process
similar to that described by Stow for Rome. But if there were ever
distinct ethnic customs in Tuscany (which may be less likely because
of the smaller population and the more diffuse immigration into the
region), we should still not expect to see the same process at work
in sixteenth-century Florence or in Tuscany as a whole. Here, Jews
were living in more than twenty towns and villages until 1571. These
Jews were neither united by any Jewish governing body, nor judged
by a Jewish court; they were neither subject to the rulings of any one
particular rabbinical authority nor apparently wont to turn consistently
to the guidance of any one such rabbi. And, in contrast to Rome, there
were no Jewish notaries or other official authorized Jewish communal
functionaries who could have taken an active role in creating a new
Jewish custom. Even after ghettoization in 1571, it would be decades
before any Jewish institutional voice in Florence was strong enough to
attempt to influence or set marital practices.76
In sum, the legal codes and responsa literature of rabbis throughout
the medieval and early modern diaspora show a familiarity with the
takkanot of Shu”m, of Toledo, and of other regions. The Jews of Italy
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– or various ethnic sub-communities – might, and may, have aligned
themselves with one or another of the traditions. But the contracts
found in the Florentine and the Roman archives suggest a more complex
picture: Jews in Christian lands continued to practice a great variety
of customs long after and despite the enactment of ordinances. Italian
Jews living in Tuscany and in Rome apparently did not consider these
enactments automatically binding, nor did they seek, as a Jewish com-
munity, to enact statutes for their own locale. And no one, at least in
Tuscany in the period before ghettoization or in the early decades of
the ghetto, had the power or authority to demand or enforce uniformity
of practice among Jews.
The stipulations we see in the notarial documents are also evidence
that notaries worked with the assumption that Jews could be exempted
from local statutory law and, as I have argued, that this assumption
was grounded in the general principle that Jews were allowed to live
according to their own laws. The details of these agreements, however,
though they distinguish Jewish practice from the legal and social prac-
tices of local Christians, nonetheless do not appear to correspond to
or to conform to one particular Jewish legal tradition or well-observed
Jewish customary tradition.
Perhaps the situation can be analogized to sartorial choice in the
early modern Italian states. Consumers could costume themselves with
elements from several national styles, modeling themselves after resi-
dent or visiting foreigners – merchants, nobility and ambassadors – or
simply choosing from exotic silks and damasks in the retail shops and
the second-hand market.77 So too, Italian Jews in the sixteenth century,
a highly mobile society, were exposed to Jews and Christians from
distant regions and foreign lands. In their marital and legal culture, a
somewhat loose identity fit better than strict adherence to the cut of
a specific “ethnic” identity and its attendant traditions. A large set of
customs and models of succession provided by non-Jewish and Jewish
traditions was available. Jews used to advantage both their status as
semi-outsiders to the local legal system and the flexibility of the pre-
nuptial pact (patto, in Roman law) or stipulated condition (tenai’, in
Jewish law), selecting and cutting the best fabrics and tailoring their
engagement and marriage contracts to specification.
The variation we see in the details of the pacts and stipulations is the
work of a Jewish population that was not bound or united by any clear
standard for laws regarding marriage and inheritance, the work of a
population of individuals who adopted and adapted customs selectively
and innovated strategically. This instance in the negotiation over the
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dowry provides us a glimpse of the way that individual Jewish families
and Jews as a minority group played to advantage their own amorphous
identity and the official notarial system to tailor their marriage agree-
ments to meet their specific financial and, perhaps, emotional needs. It
affords a glimpse of the work done together by Jews and, unwittingly,
by notaries to fortify the ambiguity of the legal autonomy of the Jews
who were assumed, on the one hand, to be subject to local legislation
and who were, on the other hand, permitted to live according to their
own laws.
The data I have considered are only suggestive of the picture that
might emerge from a full analysis of notarized Jewish marriage con-
tracts over a longer period. Nonetheless, the division of the dowry
stipulation must be understood in the context of the larger marriage
system in which it played its role, as one element of a marriage system
that differed radically from that (or those) of the surrounding Christian
culture.
Jewish patterns differed from Christian patterns in two basic ele-
ments: Jewish men married earlier than did Christian men – generally
in their early twenties, if not earlier – and a higher percentage of Jew-
ish men and Jewish women married.78 The almost universal marriage
rate was undoubtedly more an ideal than a reality, but as an ideal it
differed dramatically from the Christian model which accepted male
bachelorhood until well into the fourth decade of life as the norm and
not only tolerated but sanctified the celibate life through monacation,
Christian “marriage” to Christ or to the Church.79
In Tuscany a great percentage of Christians remained unmarried
either permanently or for extended periods of their adulthood. One fac-
tor that contributed to this phenomenon in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries was dowry-inflation. Jewish rabbinic, lay and cultural leaders
who also felt this economic and cultural pressure made allusion to,
criticized, or sought to inhibit dowry-inflation with words reminiscent
of those used by Christian moralists and governors.80 Yet there is no
indication that Jews were responding to these pressures by deliberately
limiting the marriages of their offspring in order to provide appropriate
sums for the marriages of a select number, as Christians did. This
was true even (or especially) in the wealthiest of the Jewish families.81
Jews continued to live with a traditional religious system and its cul-
tural norms: all men and all women were expected to marry, and men
were encouraged to marry young instead of waiting to inherit from
their fathers. Families that had many daughters had difficulty raising
dowries; consequently there was opportunity for new wealth to join old
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status in marriage, as occurred in the Ursi-Leucci union. In brief, then,
Christians experienced a system of dowry inflation, big age-differentials
in marriage, and high levels of monastic confession by women and of
extended or permanent single-hood, if not always celibacy, of men.82
In contrast, the Jewish marital system seems to have produced smaller
age-differentials in marriage and higher rates of marriage for both men
and women.83
Whether, in fact, Jews of all classes attained the cultural goal of
universal marriage is not known. However, the evidence does suggest
that Jewish parents considered themselves obliged to arrange marriages
for all their children and not for only one or two. They had to be
resourceful in order to provide all the dowries, thereby attracting part-
ners for their daughters, protecting them in widowhood and perhaps
against divorce, and, not least, devolving their own wealth, potentially
protecting it from creditors and taxes.84
The Jews of sixteenth century Tuscany adopted a variety of familial
strategies to enhance their ability to arrange matches for their daugh-
ters. They limited family size, tolerated first marriage of girls at ages
both below and far above the prevailing ideal of sixteen,85 borrowed
from and invested with relatives, and made arrangements whereby the
father of the bride invested his daughter’s promised dowry rather than
turning it over to his son-in-law.86 The inclusion of special legal stip-
ulations or pacts that overruled the statutory laws of inheritance and
succession in betrothal and marital contracts or in the confessio dotis
documents like the one written by Dattero in Prato might be seen as
evidence of anxiety that parents felt when preparing to disburse their
daughters’ dowries. But it may also be seen, if we dare to venture
further into the realm of emotion, as a pro-marital strategy to add to
those listed above.87 My point here is that stipulating the return of the
dowry – even though it anticipated the untimely death of a daughter
– may have facilitated the marriage deal by allowing a young woman’s
parents to think of the dowry not as wealth they were about to lose to
the control of a son-in-law, but rather as a partially-secured investment
in their future grandchildren.88 For the dowry would be returned only if
there no children survived their daughter’s death. With grandchildren
firmly in mind and referred to explicitly on paper, the bride’s parents
could release the dowry to their son-in-law.
Historians have often commented on the role the dowry played in
enhancing the status of Jewish women, protecting them from impul-
sive divorce and sheltering them (and sometimes empowering them) in
widowhood.89 It has also been argued that in the rabbinic tradition,
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stipulations returning the dowry to the parents had long been permitted
“for the good of the daughter.” That is, the tradition acknowledged
that without such stipulations parents might inadvertently ruin a girl’s
opportunity to marry, or marry well, if, in fear that she might die
childless and her husband would inherit the whole dowry, they promised
her a dowry that was too small.90 But in the context of the marital
negotiation represented in the Tuscan notarial acts, it becomes clear
that the stipulation itself is written not primarily in order to protect or
help the daughter. Rather, the stipulation is made specifically to seal
and effect a marriage deal, which is desired by the bride’s parents not
only for the good of the daughter but, inseparably coupled to that goal,
for its intended production of (grand-) children.91
The link between dowries and grandchildren was acknowledged by a
female character created by the Italian Jewish playwright Leone Sommo
of Mantua in the mid-sixteenth century. In an opening scene of Sommo’s
“comedy of betrothal,” two parents are discussing the engagement
of their daughter and the preparation of her dowry. Amon, the hus-
band and father, grumbles against what seem to him the exaggerated
expenditures:
“It is a bad path that all the women of this bad generation have
chosen, dropping gold from the[ir] pocket[s] to no end; and jewels
for empty trifles like these, to no help and to no avail.”
Deborah, his wife and the mother of the engaged daughter rejoins:
“I will not conceal from my master that we are eager to increase
the dowry and to expand the gift to the daughters of our daughters
[my emphasis]; indeed it is the sin-offering of all the women!”92
The general theme here, of course, is ostentation, a great subject
of Italian sumptuary legislation.93 Sommo’s pun may poke fun at the
devotion of women (their gift-giving is “sin” or “sin-offering”) to their
daughters’ dowries, the symbol of their status. But the playwright’s fe-
male character reveals her genealogical mode of thought as she informs
her husband and intended audience that the gifts (and status) assigned
to daughters on their marriage will be passed on to granddaughters.
Let us return from the play to the notarial act: the dotal compacts
indicate that with the dowry, a woman’s parents made a partially-
secured investment of capital in her marriage, and the interest or profits
it should bear are grandchildren. If the marriage bore no fruit and
no grandchildren were produced before the daughter died, the careful
investors who had written such a pact had reserved the right to the
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(partial) return of their capital. The inclusion of stipulations about the
return of the dowry in Jewish marriage documents may thus be seen as
a residual mark of three parental fears or concerns about the transfer
of the daughter and the dowry: loss of life, loss of assets, and loss of
lineage.
One lesson of these notarial documents and their individualized
stipulations is, clearly, that we cannot assume that Jews followed or
observed “Jewish law” or local statutes, or that they limited their
options to these choices. Even when notarized contracts do seem to
conform to Jewish law or takkanot, it is impossible to say whether the
Jews who had them drawn up were intended to follow Jewish law, and
if so whether they did so because they considered themselves obliged
to observe “it” or because they preferred its provisions to those of local
laws which would otherwise apply. In every instance, their practices
must be examined. This approach is most clearly relevant in a terri-
tory such as Tuscany, before the institution of the ghetto, where there
was no state-supported or communally-elected rabbinic or Jewish lay
authority.
Shifting our attention from centers to peripheries often results in
new insights and questions concerning the center – that is, concern-
ing central or operative scholarly paradigms, small or grand. Thus,
as questions arising from Jewish women’s history have implications for
the study of Jewish communal history, so questions arising from Jewish
history have implications for the study of Italian history. It may be that
a consideration of the strategies Jews used to pursue marriages for all
their offspring will help to complicate the view that dowry inflation
was the leading cause of lower nuptiality among Christians. Recent
studies have already pointed out some of the limitations of this still
very important model, including the critique that research on rates of
nuptiality has focused almost exclusively on patrician elites in Florence
and Venice.94 Future research will likely continue to focus on new ways
of explaining the burgeoning numbers of non-marrying Christians in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and the very late age at first marriage
for Christian men, but the explanation of these trends should take into
consideration the alternative marriage model of Jews as well as of the
Christian middle and lower classes.
The differences we see between the Jewish practice of marriage and
the Christian practice brings us back to consider the fact examined
at the outset that Christians of this period no longer negotiated the
return of the dowry in the event that the daughter died before leaving
an heir, being content (or forced) to accept municipal legislation on
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this issue, which in Tuscany granted the husband the right to keep the
dowry on condition that he had consummated the marriage. But for
Jews, the focus on universal marriage and procreation created different
concerns from those that drove the Catholic system.95 A primary goal
of the marriage, from the perspective of parents arranging it, was the
production of children. It was in light of this as much as anything else
that parents reserved the right to reclaim a dowry if that goal was not
met before their daughter died.
By accepting a level of ambiguity in their legal documents which
made it unnecessary for the Jews to specify whether they were modify-
ing Roman law, local statutes, or Jewish law or conforming to a specific
Jewish custom, Jews were able to keep their options open when they
negotiated contracts for betrothals. Stipulations, with their long history
in both Jewish and Christian practice, allowed each pair of families to
balance their goals, maximizing the dowry that the brides’ parents were
willing to promise and minimizing the risks they would face. Seen and
left on their own as a rather homogenous “other” by the state in which
they lived, individual Jews in sixteenth-century Tuscany appear to have
picked their way through diverse laws and regional or ethnic customs,
taking an elastic approach to the law of succession. Without attaching
themselves firmly to any of the well-known Jewish traditions, these
Jews of sixteenth-century Tuscany used notarial procedure to help de-
fine the rules according to which they would live, taking full advantage
of the principle that as Jews they were entitled to live according to
their own law.
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Tidjschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 49 (1981), 127–147. Given the creativity of
families in taking advantage of the patria potestas which was in effect even after
the marriage of daughters, as documented by Kuehn, it is likely that the archives
contain similar stipulations even from the sixteenth century.
24. Walter Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages
(London: Methuen, 1961), 281.
25. Thomas Kuehn, “Some ambiguities of female inheritance ideology in the Renais-
sance” in Law, Family and Women: Toward a Legal Anthropology of Renaissance
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Italy (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991), 240, repr. from Continuity and
Change 2 (1987), 11–36. On the complexity of the law in practice in Florence
see also Kuehn’s “Law and Arbitration in Renaissance Florence” in Law, Family
and Women, 19–36.
26. Kirshner, “Maritus Lucretur,” 115–116. Kirshner brings examples of pacts and
stipulations attached to confessio dotis documents in the late thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries, but these pacts modified Roman law and the tradition
seems to have ended when statutory law on the issues was adopted.
27. Through arbitration, Italian Jews could, in theory, render opinions according
to Jewish law, although they were not able to require other Jews to submit to
Jewish arbitration. On the wide use of arbitration by Christians in Florence after
1350 see Thomas Kuehn, “Law and Arbitration in Renaissance Florence,” cited
above; on the Jewish use of arbitration in lieu of (prohibited) rabbinical courts,
see Robert Bonfil, Rabbis and Jewish Communities in Renaissance Italy, trans.
Jonathan Chipman (London: Littman Library, 1993; originally published as Ha-
Rabanut be-Italyah bi-tekufat ha-Renesans, 1989), 207–230. On the codification
of the right of Jews to choose either Jewish law or ius commune in their internal
disputes, see the discussion of De Susannis’s De Iudeis (II, 4) by Kenneth R.
Stow, Catholic Thought and Papal Jewry Policy (New York: Jewish Theological
Seminary, 1977), 107 and passim. However, the present study deals not with
a case in arbitration but rather with an (as yet) uncontested notarial act and
the reconstruction of the legal and cultural assumptions of the notary and the
parties to the contract. Arbitration is separate issue: it is not at all obvious in
Italian jurisprudence that Jews were allowed to follow “Jewish law” in matters
pertaining to dowry and inheritance; Stow, Catholic Thought and Papal Jewry
Policy, 102–122.
28. Ms. Warsaw 255, f. 110r-v, edited as Document 19 (74–75) of Igron B in Letters
of Jews in Italy: Selected Letters from the Sixteenth Century, ed., Yacov Bok-
senboim, in Hebrew (Jerusalem: Ben Zvi Institute of Hebrew University, 1994).
The Warsaw manuscript is described by Boksenboim, though without reference
to this particular document, in his introduction, 13–16.
29. The Hebrew phrase used here, “dinei umot ha-’olam,” simply contrasted with
“dinei Yisra’el,” refers generally to laws that are not biblical or rabbinic in
origin. But it is worth noting that the reference is not to “gentile courts”; see
note 32 below.
30. Letters of Jews in Italy, 75.
31. Bonfil cites the fourteenth century jurist Calderini (citing Vittore Colorni, Legge
ebraica e legge locali [Milan: University of Rome, 1945], 61) as an example of a
jurist who considered Jews eligible to be judged “according to their own personal
law” (Rabbis and Jewish Communities, 207–208). Perhaps the right to be judged
by a personal law was synonymous with the right to write contracts defined by
this personal law?
32. Walter Ullman, “Baldus’ Conception of Law” in Law Quarterly Review LVIII
(1942), reprinted in Law and Jurisdiction in the Middle Ages, ed., George Gar-
nett (London: Variorum Reprints, 1988), 386–399.
33. Kenneth R. Stow, Catholic Thought and Papal Jewry Policy, 63.
34. Stow, ibid., 121; see also more broadly Stow’s summary of De Susannis’ presen-
tation of the legal status of Jews on 102–107 and his analysis on 116ff.
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35. Simonsohn, The Apostolic See and the Jews, Vol. 7, History (Toronto: Pontifical
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1991), 101; Vittore Colorni, Gli ebrei nel sistema
del diritto comune final alla prima emacipazione (Milan: A. Giuffrè, 1956), 2,
18; see also 8–9 for a concise definition of the terms.
36. For example, Innocent III (in Constitutio pro Judeis, September 15, 1199), marks
the Jews’ right to celebrate their festivals and customs; but Gregory IX in
Etsi Judeorum (April 6, 1233) instructed the Archbishop and bishops of the
kingdom of France to warn Christians there not to harm Jews (or to “drive
them from their lands without due cause”), and rather that they should permit
them “to live according to their law” (“sed secundum legem suam vivere in solitu
statu permittant”). Innocent IV, however, responded positively to the Jewish
complaint in the wake of the (papally-initiated) burning of copies of the Talmud
in Paris that if the Jews were not permitted to have their Talmud, they were
being denied the right to follow their “law” (Ad instar animalium, August 12,
1247). The texts of these papal bulls are all found most conveniently in Shlomo
Simohsohn, The Apostolic See and the Jews. Documents: 492–1404 (Toronto:
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1988).
37. For example, in the charter granted to Laudadio Rieti in Colle, “ipsi hebreo et
eius heredibus liceat sabbata eorum et eorum leges, festas et sinagogas facere et
custodire” (ASF, Magistrato Supremo 4449, f. 10v, capitula 17). The sense of
the Latin (that the Jews should be allowed to “make and keep their Sabbath,
laws, festivals and synagogues”) is not that these Jews were allowed to “make-
up” their own laws, but rather that they should be allowed to live by them.
The same words are used in the charter for Monterchi granted to Laudadio Isac
Simoni Abrami de Citerna (f. 51r), and in other privileges.
38. See on and, for Poland, note 55 below.
39. The main Jewish law codes in print by mid-sixteenth century in Italy were
Maimonides’ Mishneh torah, Jacob ben Asher’s Arba’ah turim, and, with its
first printing in Venice in 1564–1565, Yosef Karo’s Shulhan ‘arukh. (For a very
readable overview of the law codes in English see Stephen M. Passamaneck,
“Toward Sunrise in the East, 1300–1565” in N. S. Hecht, B. S. Jackson et al.,
eds., An Introduction to the History and Sources of Jewish Law [New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996], 323–358.) As stated in the Mishneh torah (Book
of Women, Marriage 22: 1): “The husband precedes all others in inheriting his
wife.” But there were also accepted procedures that allowed a man to write a
condition at the time of his marriage that he will not inherit his wife (ibid., 23:
5–7). For Italian Jews, the most important code was Jacob ben Asher’s Arba’ah
turim. Many objections are raised here, but in the end this jurist concurred
since “Rav Alfas ruled that a tenai (stipulation) is effective in the matter of
inheritance, and my father z”l (the Rosh) agreed with this as well” (Tur, Even
ha-’ezer, hilkhot ketubbot 69: 6–7). Karo, in his commentary (Beit yosef, ibid.)
which led to his ruling in the Shulhan ‘arukh, concluded that “this is indeed the
rule since the Rif and the Rambam and the Rosh and Rashba z”l agree that
if a man stipulates before the marriage ceremony that he will not inherit her,
his stipulation is valid.” The principle that a man inherits his wife was initially
established in the Mishnah, which discusses the situation of a man who wishes
to stipulate that he gives up his right to inherit his wife’s estate. Mishnah,
Women: Ketubot, 9: 1 “He who writes for his wife ‘I have no right nor claim
to your property’ . . . if she dies, he inherits . . . If he wrote for her ‘I have no
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right nor claim to your property, to its usufruct, to the usufruct of its usufruct,
during your lifetime and after your death’, he has neither the usufruct in her
lifetime nor if she dies, does he inherit her . . . ”
40. It is interesting to note that De Susannis made use of the Mishneh torah (Stow,
Catholic Thought, 161 was known; the relevant volume of the Arba’ah turim of
Jacob ben Asher (Even ha-Ezer; see note 39 above) had been printed in 1553 in
Sabbionetta.
41. A court of lay-judges, the Otto di Guardia e Balià, was assigned to handle all
civil and criminal cases involving Jews of Tuscany (see note 46 below). There
were rabbis and even small yeshivot in Tuscany, for example, in Siena; see Robert
Bonfil, Rabbis and Jewish Communities, 199.
42. Rabbis and Jewish Communities, 213–220.
43. In Ferrara, such a communal court was created just a few years later, in 1574.
See Bonfil, Rabbis and Jewish Communities, 235–236 (Ferrara) and 239–244.
44. Ibid., 177–186. At the time of submission of this article I have not yet been
able to obtain a copy of Kenneth R. Stow’s Theater of Acculturation: The
Roman Ghetto in the Sixteenth Century (Seattle: University of Washington,
2000), which provides an important new analysis of the arbitration of cases and
administration of justice in the Roman ghetto.
45. Bonfil, Rabbis and Jewish Communities, 195.
46. Giovanni Antonelli, “La magistratura degli Otto di Guardia a Firenze,” Archivio
Storico Italiano 112: 1 (1954), 3–39. Both cases between Jews and between Jews
and Christians were processed in this court; examples are given in From Tuscan
Households, passim. It does seem that Pisa and Siena may be exceptions to this
rule, in that there may have been a sufficient number of rabbinically-educated
Jews present in these cities that the Jews on some occasions settled matters
among themselves using arbitration, perhaps under the guidance of rabbinical
advisors. I thank Kenneth Stow for his reminder that even where there was
“Jewish arbitration,” we cannot assume that that arbitration was based in or
required a knowledge of Jewish law.
47. In theory the Otto would serve as a court of appeal to any lower court or
arbitration. The consilia of jurists, lawyers and other experts filed in court
cases are a difficult source few scholars have explored; there is still much work
to be done on the relationship between the Jews’ right to observe their own laws
under the principle of Personal Law and the Jews’ obligation to follow common
law under the principle that they are cives romani.
48. Christian engagement contracts, according to Julius Kirshner, employed stip-
ulations in confessio dotis documents of the thirteenth and early fourteenth
century in Tuscany to revise Roman law in favor of the husband, though they
were worded to give the dotem et donationem to whichever marriage partner
survived (“Maritus lucretur,” 115). It seems that once the Roman law had been
officially changed to grant the dowry to the widower (in the 1325 statutes of
the Podestà), such stipulations fell into disuse and reverse stipulations were not
commonly used.
49. Takkanot are rules ordained by men who lay claim to status as leaders and
rabbis and elders of a city or region. These same spokesmen invariably declared
that when communal ordinances were passed, Jews in that locale were obliged
to abide by them. The main customs are described in brief below; a convenient
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discussion of these laws is now found in Joseph Rivlin, Inheritance and Wills
in Jewish Law (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University, 1999), 60–65 with the texts of
the relevant communal ordinances, 96–102 (in Hebrew).
50. A very early custom, probably influenced by Roman law, was found among
Jews in Roman Palestine that if a woman predeceased her husband without
having borne children, the possessions she had brought into the marriage (the
neduniyyah) were to be returned to her father’s house. For a summary discussion
of the husband’s right of succession in early rabbinic law, see Epstein, The Jewish
Marriage Contract, 121–143. The Palestinian custom of inserting a clause into
the ketubbah is found in the Palestinian Talmud (Jerusalem Talmud, Ketubbot
33a and Bava Batra 16b, as cited by Epstein, 138, n. 28). This passage is also
cited by Louis Finkelstein in notes to his discussion of the takkanot of Rabbenu
Tam (Jewish Self Government in the Middle Ages [1924], 166, n. 1) and is cited
independently by Yedidiyah Cohen in “Takkanot ha-qahal be-yerushat ha ba’al
et ishto,” Shenaton ha-mishpat ha-‘ivri, 6–7 (1979–1980). According to Epstein,
Babylonian rabbis disapproved this custom, arguing that the husband would
not invest and guard his wife’s property well if he thought he would not inherit
it, and that this would result in damaging the eventual children; in addition,
they argued it would cause a rift between husband and wife, for her family
would actively interfere in the administration of the couples’ household, to the
displeasure of the husband. [Justinian’s law code ordained that if she had no
living children, a woman’s dowry was returned to her paterfamilias if he was the
donor, and if he was alive, or to any other she has specifically stipulated; and
if not, then to her heirs. If she had living children, her dowry is given to them,
but her husband has the usufruct of it during his lifetime. See above, n. 13.]
51. In addition to the question of the inheritance of the dowry, many other aspects
of marriage were modified or determined by other stipulations which cannot be
addressed here.
52. Rabbinic law distinguished between moveable property and real property, but
the fine points related to this distinction do not arise in the notarized documents
discussed here.
53. For a recent overview of the takkanot in English, see Menahem Elon, Jewish
Law: History, Sources, Principles, trans. Bernard Auerbach and Melvin J. Sykes
(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1994) 2, 787 and 835–840. An enact-
ment in Troyes which returned the whole dowry the first year, half the dowry
the second year, was adopted in thirteenth century as one of the Enactments
of Shu”m. Enactments in Toledo, Molina, Algeria, and Fez also were concerned
with the division of the deceased woman’s estate. The most comprehensive study
of these variations is Simha Assaf, “The various enactments and customs in a
man’s inheritance of his wife” (in Hebrew) in Mada’e ha-Yahadut 12 (1926), 79–
94. Assaf focuses on the differences between the takkanot of Toledo, Damascus,
and those adopted in twelfth century France and from there Germany, Hungary,
Bohemia, Moravia, Poland, Lithuania and Russia. For Italy he notes (93) only
that Ashkenazic Jews in Italy and the Balkans followed the takkanot known
as Takkanot Shu”m (i.e., ordinances from the Rhenish communities of Speyer,
W orms and M ainz), which themselves had two variants: that the husband must
return everything she brought to the marriage if she dies in the first year of
marriage without leaving a viable child, and that he returns half of what she
brought if she died in the second year without children. The variant said simply
DIVISION OF THE DOWRY ON THE DEATH OF THE DAUGHTER 101
that he returns half if she dies without children during the first two years (92).
Otherwise, if there are children, the husband inherits her fully (not sharing
with her children, as per the takkanot of Toledo) (93). Earlier Italian tradition
followed the Palestinian tradition, whether it was determined by exposure to
Palestinian traditions or was a response to the use of Roman law in various
locations.
54. Alternately, they might also become a set of standard stipulations which were
always included on the marriage contract or which were appended on a separate
contract. Sabar points out that it may be that in some medieval European Jewish
communities, stipulations were sometimes written on separate deeds rather than
on the marriage contracts, or ketubbot. See Shalom Sabar, Ketubbah: Jewish
Marriage Contracts of Hebrew Union College Skirball Museum and Klau Library
(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1990), 290 and notes on 291.
55. Communal ordinances were the more common technique for effecting changes:
other famous bans included the prohibition of a man taking a second wife with-
out his wife’s permission, and the ban requiring a woman’s consent to being
divorced. However, the history of the ordinance becomes complicated and at
times confused: a responsum of Rabbi Yosef Karo refers to the takkanah of
Rabbenu Tam as the full return of the neduniyyah if she dies within a year of
marriage (Responsa of Beit Yosef, Ketubbot, 10, as found in Rivlin, Inheritances
and Wills in Jewish Law, 61). A responsum of the sixteenth century Polish rabbi
Benjamin Skolnic (Vilna, 1894, no. 11) refers to the custom of returning half the
dowry to the husband and concludes that there is debate as to whether the other
half is returned to the heirs of the deceased woman or to those who originally
provided the dowry. Responsa of Rabbi Benjamin Skolnic are accessible also in
an English translation in Nisson E. Shulman, ed., Authority and Community,
Polish Jewry in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Yeshivah University, 1986).
56. Even ha-Ezer, hilkhot ketubbot 118. The Takkanot of Toledo printed here are
nineteen paragraphs, the last of which states that “Who stipulates with the
husband [of a woman] at the time of nissuin that if she should die (under
his authority) without living issue, one third of her neduniyyah [goes to] her
heirs . . . ” Here the “heirs” refers to children by a previous marriage, but the
tradition was also interpreted to refer to the family that provided the dowry. In
a responsum Karo refers to the takkanah of Toledo as requiring an equal division
of the dowry (Responsa of Beit Yosef, Ketubbot, 10, cited in Rivlin, Inheritances
and Wills in Jewish Law, 61.) The one-third version may be a variant that was
accepted in Algiers, while the one-half division is mentioned in the responsa
of the R. Solomon ben Adret (on these variant “Toledan” traditions see Assaf,
cited in note 3; Rivlin, 61, 97–98; Epstein, 141). A stipulation that overrides the
principle that the husband inherits his wife is invalid unless it is made during or
after the betrothal but before the marriage); see Even ha-Ezer, hilkhot ketubbot,
69: 7.
57. Most of the known ordinances are edited in Louis Finkelstein, Jewish Self-
Government in the Middle Ages (New York: P. Feldheim, 1964 [1924]).
58. Responsa of R. Azriel Diena (in Hebrew), no. 130, edited by Yakov Boksenboim,
Vol. 1 (Tel Aviv, 1977), 503. He called this custom a takkanah of Rabbenu Tam.
102 STEFANIE B. SIEGMUND
59. See note 1, above. I have borrowed the useful term “auto-ethnography” from the
work of Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation
(New York: Routledge, 1992).
60. According to Modena the first group includes not only Levantines but also
Jews of Barbary, Moors, Greeks and “those called Spaniards”; the second group
includes Jews of Bohemia, Moravia, Poland and Russia and “others.” He does
not clarify “Italians” (London, 1650, 3; Venice, 1678, 2). It is not clear in the
case of our inheritance question whether there is in Modena’s opinion also an
“Italian” custom or only other national customs which might be used by Italian
Jews who were bound by them.
61. The Ursi and Leucci families appear frequently as Tuscan Jews in my disserta-
tion (From Tuscan Households, 1995) and forthcoming book; they also appear
in the documentary collections that have been edited from the archives of neigh-
boring regions as well as in the scholarship of Michele Luzzati, Ariel Toaff, and
Kenneth Stow.
62. ASF, NM 604, 24r–26r, dated 14 October 1573. This is an engagement agree-
ment, not a “confession” of having received the dowry.
63. NM 604, 24r–25r.
64. Literally, “may God avert [it],” i.e., the evil decree.
65. NM 604, 24v. It is interesting also to note that this pact reflects the work of a
more cautious and precise legal mind, specifying that it apply if she dies after
he has been given the dowry and there are no sons or daughters.
66. When R. Azriel Diena in the responsum cited above refers to the “French and
Ashkenazic” custom he assumes that there is a self-evident ethnic identity (iden-
tity based on attachment to land of origin) that corresponds to that minhag.
And in some cities there were clearly distinguishable Jewish subcommunities –
at least for the purpose of communal prayer – based on ethnic origin or attach-
ment. But even these ethnic identities were flexible, as is argued effectively in
K. R. Stow, “Ethnic Rivalry or Melting Pot: The “Edot” in the Roman Ghetto,”
Judaism 41(1992), 286–296.
67. The notation that the pact was notarized in the house of the heirs of the Da
Pisa is found in the notary’s closing formula (ASF NM 76, 82r). The exact
relationship between the young couple and the Da Pisa family is not clear,
but it is fair to assume that it entailed some degree of patronage, if not direct
employment.
68. I have not identified the origins of the mothers. Gratiadio’s mother Ricca was
present (along with his brothers) when the pact was signed. Generally the doc-
uments do not reveal the place of origin of the mothers of the young brides and
grooms even when they do record their names. Ursi (or sometimes Orsi), from
Perugia, is known from other documentation to have been called “Tedesco.”
69. An important focus of recent Jewish historical scholarship has been to under-
stand how this interaction led to synthesis of Jewish and Christian cultural
forms, or to the explicit rejection of contemporary norms. See for example David
Malkiel’s study of a Jewish testament in which he describes the “judaification”
of that Italian literary and legal form, “Jews and Wills in Renaissance Italy:
A case Study in the Jewish-Christian Encounter” in Italia 12 (1996), 7–69.
70. I base this statement on the summaries of dozens of contracts found among
the more than two thousand notarial documents identified and summarized for
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those two decades by Kenneth R. Stow in The Jews in Rome, 2 vols. (Leiden and
New York, 1995; Tel Aviv, 1997). A comprehensive study would require thorough
analysis of the documents themselves, which I have not had the opportunity to
see.
71. See document 1058 (October 1550, 436), document 1185 (January 1552, 493)
and document 1317 (February 1553, 558).
72. Document 836 (21 May 1544).
73. In his comments on the documents Stow notes that the engagement contracts
that appear in Rome are increasingly formulaic, and that the stipulation that
will become standard is that one-third of the dowry is returned to the family
of the bride if she dies within a year. The formulary of the Jewish notary Piat-
telli appears as document 640 (Vol. 1, 257); it includes stipulations forbidding
the husband to take a second wife, and it grants the widow the full ketubbah
payment, dowry and tosefet ; it requires her consent for divorce and conditional
divorces, and it facilitates her release from a levirate obligation. As late as 1556,
however, there are still engagement contracts written that have stipulations
giving her family back one half or one quarter of the dowry. See document 1828
(February 1556, 797) and document 1871 (June 1556, 829).
74. I thank Kenneth Stow for the information that he presents this argument in
Theater of Acculturation: The Roman Ghetto in the Sixteenth Century, chap. 3,
passim. The book was not available from the press at the time of submission of
this article; for my understanding of the argument I have relied on an earlier
draft of his essay written for this issue which he was kind enough to let me read.
75. Further research on this point is necessary. Standardized stipulations can be
seen in Sabar, Ketubbah: Jewish Marriage Contracts of Hebrew Union College,
which includes reproductions of over one hundred Italian examples from the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. However, a study of these ketubbot reveals
that stipulations were customary only in some towns, especially in towns with
the largest Hispano-Jewish and Portuguese merchant populations; the two Flo-
rentine examples (dated 1722 and 1737) did not include them. See also Ketubbot
italiane: antichi contratti nuziali ebraici, ed. Liliana Grassi (Milan, 1984). The
color reproductions of sixty illustrated ketubbot from the seventeenth to nine-
teenth centuries included here suggest that stipulations were used in contracts
in Venice and Livorno and Corfu, but not in Turin or Mantua. See also Shalom
Sabar, “The Golden Age of The Ketubbah Decoration in Lugo” in Ebrei a Lugo:
I contratti matrimoniali (Lugo, 1994), 112, where he notes that the ketubbot of
eighteenth-century Lugo do not include stipulations. The stipulations in the con-
tracts from Livorno conform to the takkanot of Toledo, which were adopted by
the Iberian exiles who settled in Livorno, and from there also settled in Tunisia.
Robert Attal and Joseph Avivi, Registres Matrimoniaux de la communaute juive
portugaise de Tuni aux XVIIIe e XIXe siecles (Jerusalem, 1989), 5–6. See the
Hebrew edition (Jerusalem, 1991), 11 for the exact text of the stipulations that
appear in these Livornese/Tunisian marriage contracts.
76. These statements draw on my dissertation and forthcoming book on the Jews
of Florence, where the development of Jewish communal institutions in the late
sixteenth century and early seventeenth century is discussed and documented
at length.
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77. The new interest of early modern studies in consumerism seems not to have led
to a flourishing scholarship on sartorial fashion in sixteenth century Florence,
but the statutes and regulations of the Florentine guilds (Arte della Lana, dei
Linaiuoli and della Seta) in the mid- and late-sixteenth century are awash with
references to foreign items, as the streets and palaces were flooded with soldiers,
merchants and ambassadors. This is certainly not the same as the compulsion
for change, which Braudel says did not really occur until c. 1700. However, the
influence of Spanish style is well known, and there is evidence too of Dutch
costumes (in Venice, where one would have seen turbaned Turkish costumes as
well). See Fernand Braudel, The Structures of Everyday Life, trans. and rev.
Sian Reynolds [Berkeley, 1992], 315–321. The influence of Spanish and German
styles is noted in Carl Kohler, A History of Costume (New York, 1963 [1928]),
275–285. Meanwhile, Italians were focused on the effort to export their clothes;
see Carlo Marco Belafanti, “Fashion and innovation: the origins of the Italian
hosiery industry in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,” Textile History 27,
2 (1996), 132–147.
78. In contrast, the ideal age for female marriage did not differ clearly for Jews and
Christians; sixteen was the age that Christian patricians considered appropriate:
families who after married their daughters after age sixteen sometimes reported
them to be 16 years old. See Anthony Molho, “Deception and marriage strategy
in Renaissance Florence: the case of women’s ages” Renaissance Quarterly 41
(Summer 1988), 193–217; within rabbinic tradition the ideal age is even younger
(twelve or thirteen), but marriage this young was not the norm for Renaissance
or early modern Italian Jews.
79. For the high rate of monacation among Florentines, see R. Burr Litchfield,
“Demographic characteristics of Florentine patrician families, sixteenth to nine-
teenth centuries,” Journal of Economic History 29, no. 2 (June 1969), 191–205.
Female monacation was in part a response to the dearth of marriageable men un-
der a system of primogeniture which prevailed among Catholics (but not among
Jews) by the middle of the sixteenth century. See Judith C. Brown, “Monache
a Firenze all’inizio dell’età moderna: un analisi demografica,” Quaderni storici
29, no. 1 (April 1994), 119.
80. See, for example, the remarks of Amon (Act I, Scene I) of Leone de’ Sommi’s
Hebrew play Tsahot be-dichuta’ di-kiddushin, ed., J. Schirmann (Jerusalem,
1965). Jewish sumptuary legislation continues to be discussed by many histo-
rians. Diverse opinions include that of Bonfil (Jewish Life in Renaissance Italy
[Berkeley: University of California, 1994; trans. Anthony Oldcorn, Gli ebrei in
Italia nell’epoca del Rinascimento, Florence 1991], 104–111), who focused not
on dowry inflation but on the Jewish adoption of a model of austerity and that
of Ariel Toaff (Love, Work and Death, 15–19), who discussed these laws in the
context of social mobility and fear of ostentation but also gave one example of
a rabbinic effort in Padua (in 1506) to limit the total spent on dowries.
81. Luciano Allegra has found that the dowry system in the eighteenth century
ghetto of Turin, far from pushing women toward conversion, had the opposite
effect. The dowry firmly assured Jewish women a future; it was who were more
financially at risk, and this difference reveals itself in conversion rates for Jewish
men which were much higher than those for Jewish women. L. Allegra, Identità
in bilico: il ghetto ebraico di Torino nel Settecento (Turin, 1996), 115 and 110–
162 passim.
DIVISION OF THE DOWRY ON THE DEATH OF THE DAUGHTER 105
82. On the non-celibacy of unmarried men, see Stanley Chojnacki, “Nobility, women
and the state: marriage regulation in Venice, 1420–1535” in Dean and Lowe,
eds. Marriage in Italy, 141 (citing Guido Ruggiero, Boundaries of Eros) on
Venetian men of the ruling class having children out of wedlock; see also Michael
Rocke, Forbidden Friendships: Homosexuality and Male Culture in Renaissance
Florence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
83. Siegmund, From Tuscan Households, chap. 8.
84. Luciano Allegra has argued that the dowry of Jews of eighteenth-century Turin
should be seen as the primary strategy for devolving wealth and protecting
it from taxes and creditors. See “A model of Jewish devolution: Turin in the
eighteenth century” in Jewish History 7 (Fall 1993), 29–58. It is not clear,
however, that the taxes on estates were always higher than the tax on dowries.
85. See note 78 above.
86. Some examples of these strategies are discussed in Siegmund, From Tuscan
Households, chap. 8.
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